Abstract-A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANETs) is composed of Mobile Nodes without any infrastructure. The network nodes in MANETs, not only act as ordinary network nodes but also as the routers for other peer devices. The dynamic topology, lack of a fixed infrastructure and the wireless nature make MANETs susceptible to the security attacks. To add to that, due to the inherent, severe constraints in power, storage and computational resources in the MANET nodes, incorporating sound defense mechanisms against such attacks is also non-trivial. Therefore, interest in research of Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks has been growing since last few years. Security is a big issue in MANETs as they are infrastructure-less and autonomous. The main objective of this paper is to address some basic security concerns in EGM P protocol which is a mult icast protocol found to be more vulnerable towards attacks like blackhole, wormhole and flooding attacks. The proposed technique uses the concepts of certificate to prevent these attacks and to find the malicious node. These attacks are simulated using NS2.28 version and the proposed proactive technique is imp lemented. The following metrics like packet delivery ratio, control overhead, total overhead and End to End delay are used to prove that the proposed solution is secure and robust.
I. Introduction
A MANET [6] is defined as a wireless network of mobile nodes communicat ing with each other in a mu lti-hop fashion without the support of any fixed infrastructure such as base stations, wireless gateways or access points. The term Adhoc [9] imp lies that this network is established for a special, often extemporaneous service customized to specific applications.
Mobile Ad-Hoc NETworks (MANET) is a collect ion of wireless mobile nodes forming a temporary network without using any centralized access point, infrastructure [11] , or centralized ad min istration. To establish a data transmission between two nodes, typically mu ltiple hops are required due to the limited transmission range. Mobility of the different nodes makes the situation even more co mplicated. Multiple routing protocols especially for these conditions have been developed during the last years, to find optimized routes from a source to some destination. In MANETs, routing and resource management are done in a distributed manner; that is, all nodes coordinate to enable communications among themselves. This requires each node to be more intelligent so that it can operate both as a network host for transmitting and receiving data, and as a network router for forwarding packets for other nodes.
Security is a big concern in MANETs and prone to many security attacks [1] [8] [13] as its application extends in military application and these attacks are the challenging issues faced by researches of all times. In this paper, advanced routing attacks based on their vulnerabilities wh ich caused by them in the network have been taken up. The attacks are chosen based on the impact which is made by them in the network. The first attack chosen is flooding attack [15] , this attack will exhaust the network resources such as energy and bandwidth which leads to denial of service attack. The next most vulnerable attack is blackhole [2] attack in which rushing attack [7] has to be imp lemented in wh ich it has to invade the forwarding group and then blackhole attack will be imp lemented. The last attack which is chosen is wormho le attack in wh ich a pair of colluding attackers is present and this too will lead to low packet delivery ratio.
Robustness: Due to the mobility of the nodes, link failures are quite co mmon in ad hoc wireless networks. Thus, data packets sent by the source may be dropped, which results in a low packet delivery ratio. Hence, a mu lticast routing protocol should be robust enough to sustain the mobility of the nodes and achieve a high packet delivery ratio.
Efficiency: In an ad hoc network environ ment, where the bandwidth is scarce, the efficiency of the mult icast protocol is very important. Mult icast efficiency is defined as the ratio of the total nu mber of data packets received by the receivers to the total nu mber of (data and control) packets transmitted in the network.
Control overhead: In order to keep track o f the members in a mu lticast group, the exchange of control packets is required. This consumes a considerable amount of bandwidth. Since bandwidth is limited in ad hoc networks, the design of a multicast protocol should ensure that the total number of control packets transmitted for maintain ing the multicast group is kept to a minimum.
Quality of service: One of the important applicat ions of ad hoc networks is in military/strategic applications. Hence, provisioning quality of service (QoS) is an issue in ad hoc mu lticast routing protocols. The main parameters which are taken into consideration for providing the required QoS are throughput, delay, delay jitter, and reliability.
Dependency on the unicast routing protocol: If a mu lticast routing protocol needs the support of a particular routing protocol, then it is difficult for the mu lticast protocol to work in heterogeneous networks. Hence, it is desirable if the mu lticast routing protocol is independent of any specific unicast routing protocol.
Resource management: Ad hoc networks consist of a group of mobile nodes, with each node having limited battery power and memory. An ad hoc mult icast routing protocol should use minimu m power by reducing the number of packet transmissions. To reduce memo ry usage, it should use minimum state information.
Security and Reliab ility: Security provisioning is a crucial issue in MANET mu lticasting due to the broadcast nature of this type of network, the existence of a wireless mediu m, and the lack of any centralized infrastructure. Th is makes MANETs vulnerable to eavesdropping [5] , interference, spoofing, and so forth. Multicast routing protocols [4] should take this into account, especially in some applications such as military (battlefield) operations, national crises, and emergency operations. Reliab ility is particu larly important in mu lticasting, especially in these applications, and it becomes more difficult to deliver reliable data to group members whose topology varies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a co mplete description on working of Efficient Geographic Multicast Protocol. Section 3 describes the Trust based solution to mit igate the mu lticast attacks. Section 4 presents the experimental set up and evaluation results. Conclusion and future work are given in the final section.
II. Efficient Geographic Multicast Protocol

Overview of EGMP
This section deals with the entire description of the EGMP (EFFICIENT GEOGRAPHIC M ULTICAST PROTOCOL) and its various flaws found in the security mechanis m that makes us the protocol more vulnerable to attacks and also the details of the EGMP functionalities, exp loited by the malicious nodes to stage a blackhole attack, wormhole attack and flooding attack in the network EGMP supports scalable and reliab le membership management and mult icast forwarding through a twotier virtual zone-based structure. At the lower layer, in reference to a p redetermined v irtual origin, the nodes in the network self organize themselves into a set of zones as shown in Fig: 1 and a leader are elected in a zone to manage the local group membership. At the upper layer, the leader serves as a representative for its zone to jo in or leave a mult icast group as required. As a result, a network wide zone-based mu lticast tree is built. For efficient and reliab le management and transmissions, location information will be integrated with the design and used to guide the zone construction, group membership management, mu lticast tree construction and maintenance, and packet forward ing. The zonebased tree is shared for all the mult icast sources of a group.
To further reduce the forwarding overhead and delay, EGMP supports bidirectional packet forward ing along the tree structure. That is, instead of sending the packets to the root of the tree first, a source forwards the mu lticast packets directly along the tree. At the upper layer, the mult icast packets will flow along the mu lticast tree both upstream to the root zone and downstream to the leaf zones of the tree. At the lower layer, when an on-tree zone leader receives the packets, it will send them to the group members in its local zone.
Many issues need to be addressed to make the protocol fully functional and scalable. The issues related to zone management include: the schemes for more efficient and robust zone construction and maintenance, the strategies for election and maintenance of a zone leader with minimu m overhead, zone partitioning as a result of severe wireless channels or signal blocking, potential packet loss when mult icast members move across zones. The issues related to packet forward ing include: the efficient building of mu lticast paths with the zone structure, the handling of empty zone problem, the efficient tree structure maintenance during node movements, the reliable transmissions of control and multicast data packets, and obtaining location information to facilitate our geometric design without resorting to an external location server.
For the convenience of presentation, let's first introduce the terminologies used in the paper. In EGMP, every node is aware of its own position through some positioning system or other localizat ion schemes are assumed. The forwarding of data packets and most control messages are based on the geographic unicast routing protocol GPSR described. EGM P, however, does not depend on a specific geographic unicast protocol. Some of the notations to be used are:
Zone: The network terrain is d ivided into square zones r: Zone size, the length of a side of the zone square.
The zone size is set to r<rt /√2 , where rt is the transmission range of the mobile nodes. To reduce intrazone management overhead, the intrazone nodes can communicate d irectly with each other without the need of any intermediate relays.
Zone ID: The identification of a zone. A node can calculate its zone ID (a, b) fro m its position coordinates (x, y) as: a= (x-x 0 )/r, b = = (y-y 0 )/r where (x 0 , y 0 ) is the position of the virtual origin, which can be a known reference location or determined at network setup time. A zone is virtual and formu lated in reference to the virtual origin. For simp licity, let assume the entire zone IDs are positive.
Zone center: For a zone with ID (a,b), the position of its center xcyc can be calculated as: x = x 0 + (a* 0:5) *r; y c =y 0 + (b*0.5) . A packet destined to a zone will be forwarded toward the center of the zone. zLdr: Zone leader. A zLd r is elected in each zone for managing the local zone group membership and taking part in the upper tier multicast routing Tree zone: The zones on the mult icast tree. The tree zones are responsible for the mult icast packet forwarding. A t ree zone may have group members or just help forward the mu lticast packets for zones with members.
Root zone: The zone where the root of the mu lticast tree is located.
Zone depth: The depth of a zone is used to reflect its distance to the root zone. For a zone with ID (a, b) , its depth is
Where (a 0 , b 0 ) is the root-zone ID. Fo r examp le, in Fig. 1 , the root zone has depth zero, the eight zones immed iately surrounding the root zone have depth one, and the outer seven zones have depth two.
In EGMP, the zone structure is virtual and calculated based on a reference point. Therefore, the construction of zone structure does not depend on the shape of the network reg ion, and it is very simp le to locate and maintain a zone. The zone is used in EGM P to provide location reference and support lower -level group membership management. With the introduction of virtual zone, EGMP does not need to track individual node movement but only needs to track the membership change of zones, which significantly reduces the management overhead and increases the robustness of the proposed multicast protocol. To design the zone without considering node density, it must provide more reliable location reference and membership management in a network is chosen with constant topology changes. 
Neighbor Table Generation and Zone Leader Election
For efficient management of states in a zone, a leader is elected with minimu m overhead. As a node employs periodic BEA CON broadcast to distribute its position in the underneath geographic unicast routing, to facilitate leader election and reduce overhead, EGMP simp ly inserts in the BEA CON message a flag indicating whether the sender is a zone leader. With zone size ≤ r <rt, a broadcast message will be received by all the nodes in the zone. To reduce the beaconing overhead, instead of using fixed interval beaconing, the beaconing interval for the underneath unicast protocol will be adaptive. A non-leader node will send a beacon every period of Intvalmax or when it moves to a new zone. A zone leader has to send out a beacon every period when Intvalmin to announces its leadership role.
A node constructs its neighbor table without extra signaling. When receiving a beacon fro m a neighbor, a node records the node ID, position, and flag contained in the message in its neighbor table. A zone leader is elected through the cooperation of nodes and maintained consistently in a zone. When a node appears in the network, it sends out a beacon announcing its existence. Then, it waits for an Intvalmax period for the beacons from other nodes. Every Intvalmin a node will check its neighbor table and determine its zone leader under different cases:
The neighbor table contains no other nodes in the same zone; it will announce itself as the leader. The flags of all the nodes in the same zone are unset, which means that no node in the zone has announced the leadership role. If the node is closer to the zone center than other nodes, it will announce its leadership role through beacon message with the leader flag set. More than one node in the same zone have their leader flags set, the one with the highest node ID is elected.On ly one of the nodes in the zone has its flag set, then the node with the flag set is the leader.
Zone Supported Forwarding
In EGM P, to avoid the overhead in tracking the exact locations of a potentially large number of group members, location service is integrated with zone-based membership management without the need of an external location server. At the network tier, only the ID of the destination zone is needed. A packet is forwarded toward the center of the destination zone first. After arriving at the destination zone, the packet will be forwarded to a specific receiving node or broadcast depending on the message type. Generally, the messages related to mu lticast group membership management and mult icast data will be forwarded to the zone leader to process.
In the above design, for scalability and reliability, the center of the destination zone is used as the landmark for sending a packet to the group members in the zone although there may be no node located at the center position. This, however, may result in the fa ilure of geographic forwarding.
To avoid this problem, we introduce a zone forwarding mode in EGMP when the underlying geographic forwarding fails. On ly when the zone mode also fails, the packet will be d ropped. In zone mode, a sender node searches for the next hop to the destination based on its neighbor table, which can more accurately track the local network topology. The node selects as its next hop the neighboring node whose zone is the closest to the destination zone and closer to the destination zone than its own zone. If mult iple candidates are available, the neighbor closest to the destination is selected as the next hop.
Multicast Tree Construction
In this section, the multicast tree creation and maintenance scheme is presented. In EGM P, instead of connecting each group member directly to the tree, the tree is formed in the granularity of zone with the guidance of location information, which significantly reduces the tree management overhead. With a destination location, a control message can be transmitted immed iately without incurring a high overhead and delay to find the path first, which enables quick g roup join ing and leaving. In the following description, except when explicitly indicated, we present G, S, and M, respectively, to represent a multicast group, a source of G and a member of G.
Multicast Session Initiation and Termination
When a mult icast session G is init iated, the first source node S (or a separate group initiator) announces the existence of G by flooding a message NEW SESSION (G, zoneIDS) into the whole network. The message carries G and the ID of the zone where S is located, which is used as the initial root-zone ID of group G. When a node M receives this message and is interested in G, it will join G using the process described in the next section. A mult icast group member will keep a membership table with an entry (G, root zID, Acked ), where G is a group of which the node is a member, root_zID is the root-zone ID, and is Acked is a flag indicating whether the node is on the corresponding mu lticast tree. A zone leader (zLdr) maintains a mult icast table. When a zLdr receives the NEW_ SESSION message, it will record the g roup ID and the root-zone ID in its mult icast table. In, Fig : 1 describes the multicast group join scenario. If the message is fro m another zone, it will co mpare the depth of the requesting zone and that of its own zone. If its zone depth is smaller, i.e., its zone is closer to the root zone than the requesting zone, it will add the requesting zone to its downstream zone list; otherwise, it simply continues forwarding the JOIN_ REQ message toward the root zone. If new nodes or zones are added to the downstream list, the leader will check the rootzone ID and the upstream zone ID. If it does not know the root zone, it starts an expanded ring search. As the zone leaders in the network catch the root-zone ID, a result can be quickly obtained.
With the knowledge of the root zone, if its upstream zone ID is unset, the leader will represent its zone to send a JOIN_ REQ message toward the root zone; otherwise, the leader will s end back a JOIN_ REPLY message to the source of the JOIN_ REQ message. When the source of the JOIN_REQ message receives the JOIN_ REPLY, if it is a node, it sets the Acked flag in its membership table and the jo ining procedure is completed. If the leader of a requesting zone receives the JOIN_REPLY message, it will set its upstream zone ID as the ID of the zone where the JOIN_ REPLY message is sent, and then send JOIN_ REPLY messages to unacknowledged downstream nodes and zones.
Multicast Group Leave
When a member M wants to leave G, it sends a LEA VE (M, G) message to its zone leader. On receiving a LEA VE message, the leader removes the source of the LEA VE message from its downstream node list or zone list depending on whether the message is sent from an intrazone node or a downstream zone. Besides removing a branch through explicit LEA VE, a leader will remove a node from its downstream list if it does not receive the beacon fro m the node exceeding 2* Intervalmax. If its downstream zone list and node list of G are both empty and it is not a member of G either, the leader sends a LEA VE (zoneID, G) message to its upstream zone. Through the leave process, the unused branches are removed from the multicast tree.
Packet Sending from the Source
After the multicast tree is constructed, all the sources of the group could send packets to the tree and the packets will be forwarded along the tree. In most treebased mult icast protocols, a data source needs to send the packets initially to the root of the tree. The sending of packets to the root would introduce extra delay especially when a source is far away fro m the root. Instead, EGMP assumes a bi-d irectional tree-based forwarding strategy, with which the mult icast packets can flow not only from an upstream node/zone down to its downstream nodes/zones, but also from a downstream node/zone up to its upstream node/zone.
Multicast Data Forwarding
Maintain the mult icast table, and the member zones normally cannot be reached within one hop from the source. When a node N has a multicast Packet to forward to a list of destinations (D1; D2; D3), it decides the next hop node towards each destination (for a zone, its center is used) using the geographic forwarding strategy. After deciding the next hop nodes, N inserts the list of next hop nodes and the destinations associated with each next hop node in the packet header. In Fig: 2 depicts the multiple clusters in one zone. 
Multicast Route Maintenance and Optimization
In the zone structure, due to the movement of nodes between different zones, some zones may become empty. It is crit ical to handle the empty zone problem in a zone-based protocol. Co mpared to managing the connections of individual nodes, however, there is a much lo wer rate of zone membership change and hence a much lower overhead in maintaining the zone-based tree.
When a member node moves to a new zone, it must rejoin the mult icast tree through the new leader. When a leader is moving away fro m its current zone, it must handover its mult icast table to the new leader in the zone, so that all the downstream zones and nodes will remain connected to the multicast tree.
III. Trust Based Solution to Mitigate Attacks
This solution aims at preventing the attacks by establishing a trust relation between the nodes [14] . Cert ificate chaining is a self organized PKI authentication by a chain of nodes without the use of a trusted third party. Here authentication is represented as a set of digital cert ificates that form a chain. Each node in the network has identical roles and responsibilities thereby achieving maximu m level of node participation. Every node in the network can issue certificates to every other node within the radio communication range of each other.
A certificate is a binding between a node, its public key and the security parameters. Cert ificates are stored and distributed by nodes themselves. Every node participating in cert ificate chain ing must be able to authenticate its neighbors, create and issue certificate for neighbors and maintain the set of certificates it has issued. The issue of certificates can be on the basis of security parameters of the node. Each node has a local repository consisting of certificates issued by the node to other nodes and certificates issued by others to the particular node. Therefore each certificate is stored twice, one by the issuer and the other for who m it is issued.
Period ically certificates fro m neighbors are requested and repository is updated by adding new certificates. If any of the cert ificates are conflicting, i.e ., same public key to different nodes or same node having different public key, it is possible that a malicious node has issued a false certificate. A node then labels such certificates as conflicting and tries to resolve the conflict. If cert ificates issued by any node are found to be wrong, then that node may be assumed to be malicious. If mult iple certificate chains exist between a source and destination, the source selects a chain or a set of chains for authentication.
Consider nodes A, B and C in a network as shown in Fig : 3 Node A issues certificate to node B if it is convinced about the security level of node B. The security parameters to counter the effect of black hole attack may be node id, location of the node and the delay in processing the RREQ packet. The delay for malicious nodes is zero as these nodes do not refer the routing table and respond immed iately with a RREP message. The leg itimate nodes would have a certain delay time in referring the routing table. The certificate contains the security parameters and the public key of B signed by A. Every other node in the network can verify the signature using A's public key. Certificate issued fro m node A to node B is represented as cert (A→B). Here A is the issuer and B is the subject of the certificate. Every node forming the route has to prove its identity and obtain a certificate fro m its neighboring node. Each certificate is issued with a limited validity period and contains the time of issue and expiration time. Before a certificate exp ires, the issuer issues an updated version of the same certificate with an extended time of exp iry if the issuer node is still convinced of the security level of the subject node. This updated version of certificate is called certificate update. When node A wants to communicate with node D, it finds a chain of valid public key certificates lead ing to D. The chain is such that the first hop uses an edge from A i.e., a certificate issued by node A and the last hop leads to D i.e., certificate issued to D. All intermediate nodes are trusted through the previous certificates in the path. The last certificate contains the public key of the destination. 
Certificate Update
Each certificate has an expiry time after which it becomes invalid. If the cert ificate is still required to be used, the issuer has to update the certificate if it is still convinced about the security level of the subject node. On the other hand, if the issuing node feels that the subject node is compro mised, it will not provide the certificate update.
Certificate Revocation
When the binding between a node and its key is found to be invalid, the issuing node can revoke the certificate. The revoked certificate is not usable.
Authentication Phase
The authentication phase follows the certificat ion phase. When a source node A wants to find a route to a destination node D, it broadcasts a JREQ packet. The destination node or any other node that has a valid route to the destination now replies to the JREQ. Any malicious node may reply to the request from the source by claiming to have the shortest path to the destination. To overcome this black hole attack, source node does not initiate the data transfer process immed iately after the routes are established. Instead it waits for the authenticated reply fro m the destination. After the certification process, the destination node sends authenticated messages appended with certificates taken from the corresponding node's repository.
Algorithm to Mitigate Attacks
1) The route is established between the source and destination
2) The nodes forming the routes enter into certificate phase
3) The security parameters of the next hop nodes are requested and public key cert ificates will be issued if the security level of the node is convinced.
4) The time difference between sending of JREQ packet and receipt of the same next hop node is used as a measure of security level. The certificate contains identity of node B, the public key of B , the time of issue of certificate , the time of expiry and security level of node signed by node A. 8) Public key is calculated by applying a one way hash function H, to the identity of the node. The identity may be either IP address or MAC address 9) Since same hash function is used by all nodes, the public key generated by different neighboring nodes would be the same.
K B =H (ID B )
10) Each certificate has an expiry time, if the certificate has still required to be used the issuer has to update the certificate by checking the security parameters.
11) After the certification process the destination node sends the authenticated message append with certificate taken fro m the corresponding nodes repository.
12) The certified (JREP CERT ) packet fro m the destination would be of the form:
[Source i d, next hop i d, final destinati on i d, certificate chain]
13) When this packet reaches the next hop node
Next hop node checks its repository to see if the certificate is present. 14) Then it checks the certificate revocation list to find if the destination node is malicious or not 15) If these two verification leads to a positive result, it forwards the JREP CERT to the next hop node .while doing so it appends the certificate fro m its repository.
16) All intermed iate nodes perform the same procedure until the final source is reached 17) When the source receives the packet it checks the whole certificate chain. If there is no problem with the certificate chain data packets are sent through this route.
18) In case of legitimate node turning malicious over a period of time, the nodes behavior is recorded and the certificate would be revoked, thus isolating the node from further participation of network activities
Analysis of Certificate Key Chaining
The certificate key chaining solution protects the network through a self organized, fully d istributed and localized procedure. The additional cert ificate publishing happens only for a short duration of time during which almost all nodes in the network get certified by their neighbors. overhead incurred in this process is reasonable with a good network performance in terms of security. To believe this is an acceptable performance, g iven that the attack prevented has a much larger impact on the performance of the protocol. As certificates are stored in repository of the issuer, it can be revoked at any point of time, if the node is found to be malicious. The certificate issued by the node cannot be forged, as time of exp iry of the certificate and security level of the parameter are considered to be challenging tasks and they cannot be compromised at any point of time in the network The proposed mechanism can also be applied for securing the network fro m other routing attacks [12] by changing the security parameters in accordance with the nature of the attacks. This proposed solution can be applicable to all attacks and can be applied irrespective of the protocol to make the protocol more secure against attacks. This solution results in high packet delivery ratio and reduced control overhead, Total overhead and End to End delay.
IV. Simulation Settings
NetworkSimu lator-2.28 is used for simulat ing the parameters in the proposed experiments. The simu lated network consists of 50 mobile nodes placed randomly with in a 500 m x 500 m area. Each node has a transmission range of 250 m and moves at a speed of 1 m/s. The total sending rate of all the senders of the mult icast group, i.e., the traffic load, is 1 packet/s. We use a low traffic load value to highlight the effects of the attacks on packet loss rate, as opposed to packet loss due to congestion and collisions resulting fro m a high traffic load. The mob ility model chosen for a mobile node was the ra ndo m wa y -p oin t model. A mobile node begins by staying in one location fo r a pause time o f 0.33 seconds. Once this time exp ires, the mob ile node chooses a random destination in the simu lation area and then travels toward the newly chosen destination. Upon arrival, the mobile pauses for 0.33 seconds before starting the process again.
The attackers were positioned around the center of the mu lticast tree in all experiments; the duration of each experiment was 100 seconds in simu lated time. Every experiment was repeated 10 t imes using 10 different randomly generated seed numbers, and the recorded data was averaged over those runs. End to End Delay decreases on an average by 10.2% when Certificate key chaining solution is provided to prevent the flooding attack in EGMP. Control Overhead decreases on an average by 3.5% when Certificate key chaining solution is provided to prevent the flooding attack in EGMP. An in-depth analysis is done on the EGM P protocol and the vulnerabilities of the protocol such as blackhole attack, wormho le attack and flooding attack are identified. A trust based secure solution has been proposed to mitigate thes e attacks. Certificate key chaining solution aims in making the protocol more secure which achieves a very good rise in PDR (Packet Delivery Rat io) and a reduced control overhead and total overhead. This solution can be applied irrespective of the protocol and on any routing attack and a good convincing result can be achieved. The future work is aimed at extending the proposed solution to the other reactive protocols.
